The current project was born out of a series discussions held at MezhyhiryaFest, an annual investigative journalism conference organized by MDF. Each year the time spent looking at how to make investigative media sustainable grew, but the answers would keep leading back to a common problem – we are told to try everything but are limited by time and resources.
The current project was born out of a series discussions held at MezhyhiryaFest, an annual investigative journalism conference organized by MDF. Each year the time spent looking at how to make investigative media sustainable grew, but the answers would keep leading back to a common problem – we are told to try everything but are limited by time and resources.
This report is a first stab at defining how investigative media organize themselves, as well as how they position themselves within the larger media-civil society ecosystem
Contribute to body of knowledge about organization theory for investigative media
It aims to contribute to building a common European space within which to exchange experiences and learn both about what works and doesn't work
Finally – we hope – this project will be a source of inspiration and reflections on how to make the work of investigative media more effective, reducing the stresses of an
A definitive answer about how investigative media should or even do function, or a recipe book about how to set one up – rather it can be a starting point for reflection or debate
An attempt to compare media to see who is better or somehow rank performance – it aims to understand what drives various decisions (context, resources etc.) and how they play out
About MDF
The Media Development Foundation (MDF) is a Center of Excellence and a Media Expertise hub focused on empowering journalists and media organizations.
We believe free and vibrant media are critical to social, economic and political development.
The collapse of high-quality journalism due to the disintegration of the media revenue model, coupled with increased pressure media, is currently threatening that ecosystem. MDF works with newsrooms to help adopt innovative business models, notably via a series of media accelerator programs, and uses its wide network partner media to kick-start promising young journalists' careers, address skill gaps and share learnings from what works and what doesn't.
By building stronger media, we hope to build stronger societies.
Media do not work in a vacuum. People need media because access to unbiased, verified information provides great social value. This is particularly true for investigative journalism as it uncovers the culprits behind many of the crimes and abuse that plague society.
Our thesis is that media thus are part of a value chain that delivers great social value. Such value chains exist in any industry and connect various activities (even when carried out by actors who barely know of each other). The media value chain goes from uncovering stories, through their formatting and distribution, and ends with some form of change.
This dynamic is particularly important for investigative journalism. By its nature, investigative journalism focuses on topics of high social relevance (e.g., corruption). People may value the work of the journalists, but the real kicker is in getting the corruption to cease.
Not all the job is or should be done by journalists. Indeed, many journalists feel uncomfortable about any form of activism. This report does not take a position on the long-standing debate, but simply acknowledges that each step needs to be carried out for the value chain to deliver impact. Our model identifies three types of actors (volunteers/ activists, media themselves, and commercial entities) as participants in the value chain. Understanding how these work together – where the handover points lie and where to "play" – lies at the very heart of defining of one's operating model and path for development.
The value chain can be further broken down into concrete steps defined by specific skill/ capability requirements, as well as clear KPIs/ objectives (see appendix for details). Not all steps are consistently covered (i.e., product management and analytics tend to be neglected), but they are still included because of their importance for overall effectiveness and impact.
Materials and inputs used to compile this report were initially gathered via open-source research and in the course workshops and discussions held during the investigative journalism festival MezhyhiryaFest (Kyiv, June 2019). Experts from over 30 investigative and traditional media provided inputs, which were later followed by a survey and deep dive interviews with leadership of 9 media outlets selected for in-depth study
Collection of open-source data (media websites, annual reports) to build a preliminary understanding of the size of the media, spheres of work; content formats, business model etc.
Engaging Mezhyhiryafest participants (investigative conference) on impact, balancing journalism vs. activism, setting KPIs and operating models (all focused on investigative journalism)
Focused survey on different stages of content production (from planning to impact assessment). Questionnaire was filled by 1-3 journalist per media (depending on organization size)
Interviews with CEO/ Chief editors and financial or operational directors selected media to gain an in-depth understanding of the whole process of their media outlet's work
To dig deeper, we selected 9 leading, independent investigative media from across Europe(see map below). The media were selected to ensure a diversity of contexts and backgrounds, allowing to compare the different solutions they implemented.
Thus, they represent diverse geographies (Western, Northern, Central and Eastern Europe),diverse formats/ channels (pure-play digital, broadcast, events, print publications and even plays) or of different sizes (from just a handful to several dozen people)and have diverse backgrounds and histories. They are also members of different networks –for example, 5 are official members of the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project.
Through deep-dive interviews with senior leadership, we drilled down to understand their operating models and how their choices impacted the development of their organizations.
Investigative media tend to fall into one of four existing archetypes: fully-integrated, competency-based, local or content producer. Each has its specific strengths and weaknesses, critical success factors and monetization options. As with any model, individual media will have own solutions tailored to their specific context. Still, once can extract insights applicable to all.
The fully integrated model describes organizations that maintain 80-90% of activities in-house (usually keeping some cooperation with CSOs and technical solution providers). A key argument for this model is that keeping everything "under one roof" ensures quality, strong mission alignment, and delivery of impact. Such media typically define policy impact as part of their core mission, although models that draw a strict line at "call to action" also exist.
The main advantage of this model is full control over all parts of the process, making it particularly interesting for media in countries with few reliable partners (it also helps increase confidentiality). The public clearly links the media to impact, increasing opportunities for crowdfunding or subscription revenue.
However, managing such media, with very diverse sub-units (each with different KPIs) requires strong management skills. It also requires exceptional ability to attract and grow talent that can handle all the different functions – particularly comms and community management. As a result, this is also the most costly model, requiring significant resources to set up and run.
The competency-based model emphasizes skills and capacity as the reason for who drives each step in the value chain. Typically, such investigative organizations have their own platform, but see other media as the main distributors of content. Similarly, they hand over advocacy to volunteers and CSOs, but stay involved so that audiences link them to potential impact(increasing brand perception and membership model potential).
Flexibility and the opportunity to match this model to the teams skillset are some of the main advantages of this model. It also allows to get the best of both worlds – providing the media with the image benefits of a fully-integrated model at a much lower cost. For this to work, however, it is important the media devote significant resources to communication and has excellent relationship management skills, as it is more dependent on partners.
An additional benefit is that, in addition to the crowdfunding/ microdonation and subscription potential of the fully integrated model, the competency based model allows for content sales as a potential revenue source. Given that such models typically need to have activism as part of their in-house activities (otherwise they lose the image of change-makers), they need to strike a balance to ensure their content is perceived.
The "local" model is an innovative approach pioneered by The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (i.e., Bureau Local). It focuses on data-driven investigations with volunteers taking a leading or substantive role, particularly in data-gathering, local mobilization and policy impact monitoring/ follow-ups. Delivering impact, particularly at a local level, is a key component of the model, although the main driver of change may be the local community members (both those that participated in the reporting phase and just activists).
A unique feature and advantage of the "local" model is the immediate localization of stories – ensured during the data gathering phase – which makes the content created particularly relevant for local communities. This should help such media with crowdfunding – they have local supporters and a natural, large network of ambassadors. However, use of volunteers to create content makes the use of a paywall unlikely.
The "local" model is heavily dependent on database management skills (a valuable and pricy skillset) and needs exceptional community outreach capabilities to be successful. On the other hand, it produces a large amount of unique, localized content at a relatively low cost, making sale of content to local media a possibility (albeit potentially again running into the.
The content producer model is used by media overwhelmingly focused on production of investigative content. Other media platforms are by design the main vehicles for distribution of content, while civil society partners help inform the selection of topics to investigate (however, this is typically a loose relationship). This model typically sees policy impact as outside the core mission of media organizations.
The most economical of models, content producers typically require the lowest upfront investment to launch and have lower operating costs. They are also operationally simple, with clear KPIs and fewer human resource challenges vs. the other models
However, content producers have generally lower revenue generation opportunities – subscriptions and paywalls are unlikely to succeed as the organization is often not associated with the content, let alone the potential impact. Moreover, content sales – arguably the main revenue driver – tend to be below the cost of running an investigation in most markets, and content producers can easily become dependent on partners to run their stories, limiting their control of the process.
Success for a given model is dependent on specific criteria – key success factors – that play an oversized role in determining the outlet's prospects. For example, it is critical for "content producers" to have strong relationship management skills (including negotiations) to ensure distribution of the content they produce, and to sell content if the media in case of financial sustainability goals. Conversely, a "content producer" will not typically be troubled by a lack of people specializing in community outreach – this is not a relevant internal step in their model. To be clear, the existence of key success factors does not mean that other skills can be ignored. For example, all media require managerial ability or the know-how to produce quality content. Rather, one can think of these as factors – should they be lacking – that will most quickly damage the organization's ability to operate or the media's image. For example, failing to properly manage databases will almost immediately cause "local" investigations to collapse.
Key success factors can also help guide media in allocating resources. It is worth noting that the minimum to allocate will vary by model and any break in the chain (or at least in key links) will reverberate across the organization. Hence, for example, "fully integrated" players are the most exposed and at risk in case of any shortages of both staff and funding.
Different models present different opportunities to build sustainable revenue streams. As previously noted, given the bespoke situation of most media, revenue generating opportunities will also be dependent on individual context. However, it is possible to identify monetization strategies that are more or less likely to succeed depending on the model selected.
This is most clearly visible for content producers. Because they rely on other media to distribute content and have a less visible public brand, they are less likely to rely on microdonations – people simply don't associate them with the impact of their work. Conversely, they are best positioned to monetize the sale of their content by building partnerships with other media. Providing technical services will depend on where their role cut's off – typically it is before production and product management steps, making the sale of expertise less likely.
Subscriptions and microdonations are the main potential drivers of revenue for both competency-based and fully integrated models, as their brand and association to impact is highly visible. Paywalls, at least, will be more difficult for the "local" model – given dependence on volunteers, making people pay for access can be a hard sell (although it does not limit voluntary contributions, particularly given the wide community network this model is based on).
Note: The "local" model is still very young – findings are prospective and highly preliminary
All investigative media surveyed for this report share a common problem: they operate on a scale too small to be sustainable. The demands of successful digital newsroom – technical specialists, engagement managers, content production tools – are constantly growing. Gone are the days when a few reporters could do the job – if they ever existed, as in the past many investigative units were part of larger media and leveraged their resources. It is worth noting that no media felt comfortable with their level of product management and analytics.
Outlets are sub-scale, struggling to attract, grow and fund new staff. As a result, they need to explore new paths to fill the gaps. These include pooling resources in networks (note these should emphasize technical and product-related functions, not just editorial support), partnering with larger organizations, or (re)integrating into larger media, thus going full circle.
Media surveyed as part of the research focus on so-called heavy investigative topics (see word cloud of priority topics on the left), such as financial and political crime. While of paramount social importance, such topics tend to be very demanding of readers and hence require significant graphic/ storytelling resources to ensure readers can comprehend them.
Furthermore, it appears there is a gap in regards to so-called social investigations, which tend to generate broader audience reactions. The examples cited by media interviewed involved such topics consumer goods (notably bad quality meat), scams on phones or investigations into real estate markets.
Hence, media that need broad community engagement for their model to succeed should also look to the topics they cover.
Word cloud of investigation topics submitted via survey and in materials created by selected investigative media.
Journalists and editors tend to be bogged down in reporting and storytelling work – leaving precious little time for promotion, community engagement or other activities. While there is often no way around this, it still ends up hurting the media's efforts e.g. promoting stories to ensure maximum reach or doing community outreach.
In particular, it is worth noting that 85% of journalists claim data and source availability are the biggest obstacles in their daily work and hence often represent the biggest time sinks. In order to maintain strong promotion, about 40% of media work with specialized external or internal SMM and/ or communication managers on promotion.
Journalists also have limited exposure to impact tracking – roughly a third are involved in this, with another 25% of media using separate team members for this role
In addition to general recommendations, insights derived from specific models suggests a one-size fits all approach is not optimal and can even be detrimental to certain archetypes. For example, fully integrated models need a lot of help in building managerial skills and designing business processes. Conversely, content producers should be supported (and encouraged) to build commercial relations with partner media – potentially via a subsidy to sales.
Investigative media should also reflect on where their model falls – as well as where and why it differs from the archetype – as this will help improve understanding of needs.
Over-invest in building up senior managers (with split between areas of activity) and supporting business process organization
Emphasis on developing product management and analytics – typically critical weak link
Strong push on media developing membership model to generate sustainable revenues
Encourage private sector partnerships and ensure finance admin has required flexibility
Strong push on media developing membership model to generate sustainable revenues
Push for specific KPIs for each step to ensure partners work toward overarching objectives
Support experimental monetization models (e.g., sale of data to academia, government) by funding business development staff
Encourage the "local" investigation unit to work with largerorganizations or network (connecting to other media as needed)to ensure scale
Push for media to secure agreements with major contentdistributors – potentially modelling financial support as a subsidy
In mid- to long-term, support should allow sale of exclusive rights for distributors to monetize and build a market for investigative content
Control of distribution
Strong brand visibility and perceived connection to impact
Some control of distribution
Strong brand visibility and perceived connection to impact
Potential to sell localized versions of stories to local media at low cost (relatively low effort to produce versions)
Main potential revenue driver
Orgs can even sign over exclusivity (no conflict with own platform)
Perceived link to impact/ activism increase donation potential
Strong brand visibility
Perceived link to impact/ activism increase donation potential
Strong brand visibility
Volunteers/ community leaders act as ambassadors
Local dimension increases relevance, boosting donations
Low brand visibility limits donation potential
Limited activism, which typically drives donations
Own platform is main distribution platform – hence sales of content are unlikely (except e.g., documentaries)
Potential sale of content to partners
Some challenge around rights – need to balance own site vs. partners
Potential to sell localized versions of stories to local media at low cost (relatively low effort to produce versions)
Main potential revenue driver
Orgs can even sign over exclusivity (no conflict with own platform)
Strong visibility/ brand can translate into event monetization opportunities
Strong visibility/ brand can translate into event monetization opportunities
Lots of community events, but focus on volunteer help and activism – tough to monetize
Low brand visibility Typically lean team structure – hence lack of capacity to run events
Media typically need to develop broad (full-spectrum) skill-set, allowing to provide technical services
Competency based media typically outsources technical tasks – less likely they have capacity to provide services
Expertise in database design and management can be provided on contract basis
Not a core area of operation for media, hence limited experienceTeams typically lack tech specialists
Teams typically lack tech specialists
Better to keep staff on core activities vs. trainings which can distract
Better to keep staff on core activities vs. trainings which can distract (limited capabilities)
Model-specific and database management trainings present significant potential revenue source
Major potential source Focus on reporting/ editorial trainings – for both newsrooms and journalists
Content can be repackaged into alternative formats.
Strong brand and distribution supports publishing
Content can be repackaged into alternative formats.
Strong brand and some distribution supports publishing
Investigations are distributed rather than sequenced, so more challenging to compile intopublication
Low brand visibility – reporters typically prefer to publish under home media/ personal brand
Limited opportunities (activism increases likelihood of real and perceived conflicts of interest)
Limited opportunities (activism increases likelihood of real and perceived conflicts of interest)
Potential sale of data to local government/ academia or others
Expertise in reporting translates well to business/ market intel provision (but need to manage conflicts)
Main revenue source
Potentially significant
Limited/ minor source
Very unlikely
Managing partner of Jnomics, Lecturer at Stockholm School of Economics in Riga
PhD, Media Expert, Head of Research at Media Development Foundation
PhD, Deputy Director for Research, Mohyla School of Journalism
Project Managerat MDF, Bachelor of Journalism at Ostroh Academy National University
